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Christian Faith, Free Will and Neuroscience 
 




In this contribution I explain what the libertarian conception of free 
will is, and why it is of moral and religious importance. Consequently, 
I defend this conception of free will against secular and religious 
charges. After that, I present and evaluate neuroscientific experi-
ments on free will, especially Benjamin Libet’s experiments. I argue 
that Libet’s experiments do not decide the debate between compati-
bilist and incompatibilist conceptions of free will; that is a conceptual 
issue and not an empirical one. Nor do Libet’s experiments count 
against the libertarian conception of free will that I defend, because 
they deal with arbitrary actions rather than actions that we do for a 
reason.  I conclude by summing up the case for a libertarian concep-
tion of free will, giving attention especially to a religious reason for 
preferring this conception. 
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INTRODUCTION 
At the beginning of the 21st century, neuroscience is booming and in its 
wake, belief in free will is on the decline. In this contribution I will inquire (1) 
how free will and morality are connected and (2) how free will and Christian 
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faith are connected. Moreover, (3) I will give a brief survey of neuroscientific 
findings on free will. Consequently, (4) I will discuss the claim that Christian 
faith and/or morality are threatened by neuroscientific findings on free will. 
To what extent is this the case? In light of the complexity of the field, it is 
inevitable that I simplify some of the issues. If, however,  I succeed in provid-
ing a conceptual map of the main issues, in demythologizing some contem-
porary myths and in indicating what are the main issues that deserve further 
discussion in the philosophy of religion, I will consider my mission for this 
contribution to be completed. 
 
FREE WILL: INTRODUCTORY CONCEPTUAL EXPLORATIONS 
A quarter of an hour ago, at 7:30 on 27 February 2012, I have begun to 
write down my paper for the ESPR conference 2012. Though the deadline for 
this paper has already elapsed and the second speaker of the ESPR session on 
neuroscience and free will is eagerly awaiting my first paper, I might have 
postponed the writing of the paper even further. I decided, however, that fur-
ther postponement would be irresponsible and I started writing. Now let’s 
step back and take a look at what I have just said. I have claimed that the fact 
that I started to write this paper did not just happen to me, was not the result 
of a chain of events inevitably leading to it (e.g., mail exchanges with Peter 
Jonkers and Aku Visala), but was the result of my decision. In my experience, 
it was I who took the decision; I am in charge and responsible, both for the 
fact that there is a delay and for the fact that there is to be no further delay. I 
am aware, of course, that external factors have influenced me. If I had not 
received reminders I would probably have given precedence to yet another 
paper. Nevertheless, the fact that I have begun today is the result of my deci-
sion.  
This is, I submit, what is involved in a common sense view of free will. 
Note that the word ‘will’ does not appear in this account. It is not needed. 
The point is that ordinarily, I take my decisions and commit my actions. I just 
added ordinarily, because most people would claim that this is the default 
position, but would have no problem in admitting that there would be excep-
tions. Under the influence of alcohol, for instance, people apparently do 
things that they would ordinarily not have done: Alcohol reduces our control.  
That is one of the reasons why we should control our consumption of alco-
hol. Medicine may have a similar effect – even though we may not be aware 
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of that when taking it – and so may some psychological conditions. These 
exceptions do not endanger the default position that I am in control. Moreo-
ver, most people would readily admit that even under ordinary circums-
tances, they do not control themselves entirely. Our actions are rooted in a 
bodily basis, a physiological pattern that is given to us, perpetuating itself 
automatically. This stable pattern of bodily activity – heart beat, respiration, 
blood circulation – may be under our control to a very limited extent only (if 
I stop these processes, that is the end of my career as an agent), but that is 
not considered as threatening my control. As Thomas F. Tracy has argued, 
‘this stable pattern of bodily activity provides the foundation for the life of an 
agent because it permits a margin of intentional variation.’ 1 In other words, 
our actions are rooted in a bodily substrate that is to a large extent given to 
us; this does not threaten our being agents but enable it, as long as we are 
able to control our body to some extent. The more control, the more freedom 
to act. That is why we take trouble to increase the control of our bodies 
(whether it is in learning to walk or in learning to play the piano): it increases 
our range of actions. 
The above may be summarized as follows: freedom is always freedom of, 
freedom to and freedom from, and freedom involves control. Freedom of: A 
free act is not an arbitrary act; it is the act of someone. My action is explained 
by me, by my decision. In many cases those who know me can to a certain 
extent predict me. Freedom to: It is the freedom to start writing a paper or to 
delay that start; more generally, it is the ability to do something or to abstain 
from it. Freedom from: Freedom is always freedom from compulsion: when I 
am free, the causal antecedents of my action do not make that action inevita-
ble. Control: If the agent does not control the action, but the action is ran-
dom, it is not free. Absolute freedom, then, does not exist.  
In our daily lives, we consider freedom to be important. Why? On a se-
cular level, I think, because we see freedom as a necessary condition for re-
sponsibility: No responsibility without control. If an agent does not act freely, 
she cannot be held responsible for her actions. In other words, persons who 
are not free from compulsion or who did not have alternatives, cannot be 
held responsible. This also means that our legal system is based on the as-
sumption that in principle, people are free. To the extent that they are not, 
they are in a state of diminished responsibility and qualify for reduction of 
                                                 
1
 Thomas F. Tracy, God, Action and Embodiment (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1984), 104. 
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sentence. Freedom is important in other domains of life as well. Our whole 
way of thinking about love and friendship assumes that we are free to chose 
with whom we will have these relationships. The fact that a person freely 
chooses me for a friend is one of the things that makes his friendship valua-
ble for me. And the fact that I am free to return his friendship or not is one of 
the things that make my positive response valuable to him. Moreover, one of 
the most influential ideals in contemporary society, that of autonomy, pre-
supposes that we are free. We can be autonomous only to the extent that our 
actions are truly our own and are not caused by factors outside our control, 
i.e., in so far as we are free. The same applies to the political ideal of democ-
racy: people are allowed to choose their own government on the presupposi-
tion that when they choose, this choice is their choice, so that the resulting 
government expresses the will of the people. 
On a religious level, freedom and responsibility are not less important. 
Theists generally think that it matters what we believe and that it matters 
that we live according to our beliefs. They may even think that our final des-
tiny depends upon it. Now if that is the case, we must again be responsible 
and therefore free. Even those who do not think that our final destiny de-
pends upon the decisions we make during our lives, however, will often argue 
that it is of paramount importance that we return the love of God and that 
we love our neighbors. And here again, love requires freedom. Moreover, free 
will may – but need not – play a role in various contexts in theology and phi-
losophy of religion, for example in a free will defence, an attempt to reconcile 
the existence of evil with the existence of a good, omnipotent and omniscient 
God by arguing that evil is due to human free actions for which God cannot 
be held responsible. 
 
FURTHER CONCEPTUAL EXPLORATIONS: THREATS TO BELIEF IN FREE WILL2 
Free will may be important, but there are a number of reasons not to be-
lieve that we actually have free will. These reasons again fall apart into two 
groups: secular reasons and religious reasons.  
                                                 
2
 For the philosophical distinctions introduced in this section see current introductions to free 
will like Joseph Keim Campbell, Free Will (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011); T.J. Mawson, Free Will: A 
Guide for the Perplexed (London: Continuum, 2011); Ted Honderich (ed.), The Determinism and Free-
dom Philosophy Website, http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwIntroIndex.htm (visited 5 May 2012). 
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Secular reasons for not believing in free will are motivated by science. 
Science seeks to explain things, and in the course of doing so it lays bare 
causal sequences: chains of cause and effect. It is useful to be aware here of 
the fact that causal explanation hardly ever involves single causes: mostly, it 
is a causal condition rather than a single cause that explains an effect. If I 
turn the light switch, that may be called the cause of the room becoming il-
luminated; nevertheless, the room would still in darkness if the Electricity 
Company would not supply electricity, if my wife would not have paid the 
bills, etc. etc. A full causal explanation is almost always complicate rather 
than simple. A full causal complication, moreover, does not only include 
causes, but also the causes of these causes etc. In principle, for each cause 
science may legitimately ask for the cause of that. It is here that a tension 
with belief in free will emerges, for as we have just seen, this belief supposes 
that the explanation of free actions has an end in the person who acts, or in 
that person’s free will. If I claim that I did a certain action, I do not claim my 
act of will is a full explanation for that action; circumstances like those just 
mentioned (e.g., there being electricity) will invariably figure in full explana-
tions of my actions. But I do claim that my choice is not explained by a chain 
of cause and effect that stretches back for an indefinite time: It was I who 
made the choice or committed the action, and if this is merely an appropria-
tion of a particular part of a chain of causes and effects that in no way differs 
from other chains of cause and effect like those determining the weather or 
the orbits of the planets, it becomes meaningless to claim that my act is a free 
act.  
This comes down to the claim that free will and determinism are in-
compatible, a claim that I would like to defend. I defend indeterminism with 
respect to human choices and actions, therefore; I do not take position here 
with respect to the choice between determinism and indeterminism in a 
more general or cosmic way. Indeterminism with respect to human choices 
and actions is compatible both with cosmic determinism and cosmic inde-
terminism, I submit.3 It is important to note, however, that in the philosophi-
cal literature on free will and determinism another position is frequently de-
fended: Simultaneous acceptance of determinism and free will, made possible 
by a revised, more limited definition of free will. Because this view of free will 
                                                 
3
 In that case, of course, cosmic determinism becomes determinism with an exception: Free will. 
From now on, I will use ‘(in)determinism’ in the limited sense of (in)determinism with respect to hu-
man choices and actions only, not in the wider sense of cosmic (in)determinism. 
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is compatible with determinism, it is called the compatibilist view of free will. 
Compatibilists assert that if an action is voluntary in the sense that we are not 
compelled to do it against our will, that action is free. Most philosophers 
would admit that determinism leaves room for actions that are free in this 
sense: Determinism asserts that insofar as we have a will, that will is the ef-
fect of a causal sequence (genetic factors and environmental factors) as well, 
but it does not assert that our actions take place against that will. For these 
philosophers, this compatibilist form of free will is sufficient for responsibil-
ity. For them, I would say, appropriation of the action is more important than 
control or origination (in the sense of having done the action while being 
able not to do the action). 
The opposite of compatibilism is incompatibilism; incompatibilists de-
fend libertarian free will, that is to say they defend that if a person freely 
commits an action, this person should have been able to act otherwise as 
well. Mere identification with an action is insufficient for full responsibility, 
incompatibilists hold. We generally hold that this applies to other persons’ 
actions: identifying with someone else’s terrorist attack is morally repugnant, 
but does not bring full moral and legal responsibility for that attack with it. 
Incompatibilists hold that this also applies to one’s own actions: if one could 
not avoid one’s own actions because these are fully causally determined, 
identification with or appropriation of these actions does not suffice to make 
one fully morally and legally responsible.  I am not going to argue in full for 
this view here. I suggest, however, that most compatibilists will to a certain 
extent share my intuition with respect to identification being insufficient for 
responsibility; the reason they nevertheless reject a libertarian view of free 
will is that they judge that it is either indefensible in light of the findings of 
science, or has never yet been articulated in a philosophically acceptable way. 
By confronting some of the scientific findings that are the most difficult to 
accommodate within a libertarian view of free will, those of the Libet experi-
ments, later on in this paper, I hope to take away at least part of their objec-
tions to libertarian free will. 
Religious reasons for not believing in free will are motivated by the 
Christian understanding of either God’s foreknowledge, providence or pre-
destination. Providence and predestination, if they are well understood, con-
stitute no problems for free will, I submit.  When we say that God is provi-
dent, we say that God guides nature, history and individual lives in accor-
dance with God’s goals. If we are determinists as outlined above, we may be-
lieve that God can fully determine nature, history and individual lives; if we 
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are not, we can interpret God’s providence in terms of a salvific influence that 
in no way hinders free will. Predestination is about one’s eternal destiny 
rather than about one’s free choices; this doctrine wants to assert that human 
salvation is entirely dependent upon God, not upon human choice. Contrary 
to what is often thought, even the strictest form of predestination, double 
predestination, is compatible with libertarian free will. Predestinatarian the-
ologies do assert that there are limits to free will, of course: one cannot will 
oneself to salvation. That there are limits to free will, however, is a general 
given of experience: I cannot by the exertion of free will jump to the moon or 
become a marathon champion either, because the first is impossible and the 
second is impossible for me, given my lack of talents in this field.  
Foreknowledge is a different cup of tea, I think, because the assertion of 
full foreknowledge does create problems for libertarian free will. If God 
knows all free acts in advance, these acts are determined when God knows 
them and the actors lack the ability to act otherwise. For determinists this is 
not a problem; it is merely another argument against libertarian free will. 
Incompatibilists like myself have two options available. Firstly, they may – 
with Augustine and Boethius – assert that God does not exist in time but 
eternally, which means that He lacks temporal location and extension. Fore-
knowledge is then no longer foreknowledge; God does not know in time. In-
genious attempts have been made to show how eternal existence can yield 
omniscience with respect to temporal events and (free) actions even if de-
terminism is not true.4 Personally, I don’t believe that these attempts work; as 
soon as one uncovers their hidden inconsistencies, a hidden determinism is 
uncovered as well.5 That is why I opt for another possibility: God has limited 
knowledge of the future only: ‘It is logically impossible for God to know with 
certainty the future choices to be made by free persons. This should not be 
seen as a denial of omniscience, any more than it is a denial of omnipotence 
that God cannot perform actions that are logically impossible.’6  
Though there is a tension between divine foreknowledge and libertarian 
free will, then, there is no need to resolve this tension in such a way that lib-
                                                 
4
 Eleonore Stump & Norman Kretzmann, ‘Eternity,’ The Journal of Philosophy 78/8 (August 1981), 
429–458, reprinted in: Thomas V. Morris (ed.), The Concept of God (Oxford: OUP, 1987), 219–252. 
5
 Marcel Sarot, ‘Omniscient and Eternal God,’ in: M. Wisse, M. Sarot & W. Otten (eds.), Scholas-
ticism Reformed: Essays in Honour of Willem J. van Asselt (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 280-302. 
6
 William Hasker, ‘Analytic Philosophy of Religion,’ in: William J. Wainwright (ed.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: OUP, 2005), 421–446, quot. 437. 
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ertarian free will is denied. Since I have argued above that libertarian free will 
is important to theism, the upshot of the religious considerations concerning 
libertarian free will seems to be in favour of it. It seems that the findings of 
science are a more serious problem for those who want to ascribe libertarian 
free will to human beings than the beliefs of Christendom. Let us now turn, 




BENJAMIN LIBET’S EXPERIMENTS ON FREE WILL 
Benjamin Libet’s experiments on free will did not come out of the blue. 
In these experiments, he built on earlier experiments that suggested that 
conscious awareness of certain brain processes was delayed by 500 millisec-
onds, and that people in hindsight often think that their conscious experi-
ences took place at an earlier moment than they in fact did (‘backward refer-
ral’).7 In the most famous experiment in which Libet brings empirical evi-
dence to bear on the question whether we have free will,8 he starts from the 
fact that if people perform self-initiated voluntary acts, like a quick flexion of 
the fingers or wrist, a DC system with an active electrode on the scalp can 
measure a slow electrical change at the vertex that precedes the actual 
movement by up to 1 second or more. This electrical change is called the 
readiness potential (RP). In other words, approximately a second elapses be-
tween the first perceptible brain change (RP) and the actual movement. Libet 
knew, as we all know, that our conscious decision to move precedes our 
movements. He doubted, however, whether the time between conscious de-
cision and actual movement is as long as a second. If the time was smaller, 
that would mean that brain changes leading to the movement were begin-
ning before the conscious decision was made. In order to ascertain whether 
this really is the case, he devised an ingenious clock, an oscilloscope timer, 
which has a dot that moves at approximately 25 times the speed of the 
                                                 
7
 On these experiments, see Adina L. Roskies, ‘Why Libet’s Studies Don’t Pose a Threat to Free 
Will,’ in: Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Lynn Nadel (eds.), Conscious Will and Responsibility: A Tribute 
to Benjamin Libet (Oxford: OUP, 2011), 11–14. 
8
 Libet began to publish about these experiments in the early 1980s. For an elegant and famous 
summary of his findings, see Benjamin Libet, ‘Do We Have Free Will?’, Journal of Consciousness Studies 
6/8–9 (1999), 47–57; reprinted in Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (Oxford: OUP, 
2002), 551–564 and in Sinnott-Armstrong & Nadel (eds.), Conscious Will, 1–10. 
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sweep-second hand of an ordinary clock. The ‘seconds’ at the dial of this 
clock were equivalent to about 40 milliseconds. Experiments show that sub-
jects using such a clock can report the actual time at which a weak electrical 
stimulus was delivered to their skins with an error of only -50 milliseconds. 
When Libet asked subjects to indicate the moment of their actual conscious 
decision at this clock, he found that RP started 550 milliseconds before the 
act, human subjects became aware of the intention to act 350–400 msec after 
RP and 200 msec before the actual motor act. Even admitting an error of -
50msec, this would still place the conscious decision firmly after the RP.  
Many scholars conclude from Libet’s experiments to free will scepticism, 
so much so that Benjamin Libet, Anthony Freeman and Keith Sutherland 
write that  
Much of the contemporary case for the illusory nature of free will is derived 
from the experimental work of Libet and his colleagues9 
and Tim Bayne calls  
Libet’s studies concerning the neural basis of human agency … the most influ-
ential rebutting [of free will – MS] objection in the current literature.10  
Libet’s alleged objection is reinforced by more recent experiments, that sug-
gest that we can view the process leading to free acts begin up to ten seconds 
before the act.11 Thus, the indications that free will – if we may continue to 
call the process through which we make our decisions thus – is rooted in 
brain processes that precede (and partly elude) consciousness, become 
stronger and stronger. On the other hand, as John Searle has noted, ‘This ex-
perience of free will is very compelling, and even those of us who think it is 
                                                 
9
 Benjamin Libet, Anthony Freeman & Keith Sutherland, ‘Editor’s Introduction: The Volitional 
Brain,’ Journal of Consciousness Studies 6/8–9 (1999), ix–xxiii, xvi. 
10
 Tim Bayne, ‘Libet and the Case for Free Will Scepticism,’ in: Richard Swinburne (ed.), Free Will 
and Modern Science (Oxford: OUP: 2011), 25–46, 26. Free will scepticists who appeal to Libet include 
Gerhard Roth, Das Gehirn und seine Wirklichkeit: Kognitive Neurobiologie und ihre philosophischen 
Konsequenzen (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1994); Sean A. Spence, ‘Free Will in the Light of Neuropsychiatry,’ 
Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3/2 (1996), 75–90; Dick Swaab, Wij zijn ons brein: Van baarmoeder 
tot alzheimer (Amsterdam: Contact, 
5
2010); Daniel Wegner, The Illusion of Conscious Will (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2002). 
11
 See Chun Siong Soon, Marcel Brass, Hans-Jochen Heinze & John-Dylan Haynes, ‘Unconscious Deter-
minants of Free Decisions in the Human Brain,’ Nature Neuroscience 11 (2008), 543–545. 
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an illusion find that we cannot in practice act on the presupposition that it is 
an illusion.’12 
Libet himself is a clear example of this. He concludes from his experi-
ment:  
The volitional process is therefore initiated unconsciously. But the conscious 
function could still control the outcome; it can veto the act. Free will is there-
fore not excluded. These findings put constraints on views of how free will may 
operate; it would not initiate a voluntary act, but it could control performance 
of the act.13 
In other words, Libet suggests that free will is not nonexistent, but operates 
in a different way: it does not generate our decisions but controls them. If it 
wants to, free will interrupts the process leading to our acts and thereby pre-
vents them. If it endorses the act, free will gives in to the process leading to 
it. In the literature this is sometimes characterized as freedom of won’t rather 
than freedom of will.14 
There’s a host of technical questions that could be asked about the reli-
ability of Libet’s experiments. Libet may have been the first to engage in sig-
nificant empirical research on free will, but novel research designs are prone 
to contain errors that have to be corrected by later generations of research-
ers. There’s the technical question, for example, if subjects who are required 
to divide their attention between their own action and position of the clock 
face are not likely to make errors in temporal order judgements.15 There’s the 
not less technical, but crucial question whether RP reflects processes in-
volved in initiating a movement or in forming a conscious intention.16 Since 
we are often unaware of our intentions (e.g., I am aware of driving, steering, 
accelerating, changing gear, etc. but not of the intentions to do all these 
things), becoming conscious of the intention (as required in Libet’s experi-
ments) may often temporally follow the intention itself – even though we 
                                                 
12
 John Searle, ‘Free Will as a Problem in Neurobiology,’ Philosophy 76 (2001), 491–514, quot. 494. 
13
 Libet, ‘Do We Have Free Will?’, 47. 
14
 Alan L. Mittleman, A Short History of Jewish Ethics: Conduct and Character in the Context of 
Covenant (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 36; Sukhvinder S. Obhi & Patrick Haggard, ‘Free Will and 
Free Won’t,’ American Scientist 92 (2004), 358–365. 
15
 Bayne, ‘Libet and the Case for Free Will Scepticism,’ 27; Roskies, ‘Why Libet’s Studies Don’t 
Pose a Threat to Free Will,’ 20; T.J. Mawson, Free Will: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: Continuum, 
2011), 129. 
16
 Roskies, ‘Why Libet’s Studies Don’t Pose a Threat to Free Will,’ 15–16. 
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would ordinarily call the intention itself a ‘conscious intention.’ If that is the 
case, we can ask: Is Libet measuring the interval between conscious intention 
and movement, or between consciousness of conscious intention and move-
ment?17 While all of these questions on Libet’s experiments can be seen as 
throwing doubt on his results and thus supporting libertarian free will, some 
empirical questions go in the opposite direction. For example, if brain proc-
esses precede our conscious decision to act, is it not likely that brain proc-
esses also precede our conscious processes to veto an act? In what sense do 
we have ‘free won’t,’ then?18 I abstain from an in-depth discussion of these 
questions for three reasons. (1) Scientists themselves have not come to defini-
tive decisions on these. (2) As long as scientists disagree, philosophers cannot 
do much more than pick and choose, and that with less authority than a sci-
entist making such a choice would have. (3) We don’t need answers to all of 
these questions for our purposes. 
The main reason why we don’t need these answers is that the type of ac-
tions that is studied in Libet’s experiments and the like, is neither morally 
nor religiously relevant. Spontaneously generated simple motor movements 
that have no real consequences do qualify as free acts for those who believe 
in free acts; there is no question about that. Nor is it difficult to understand 
why Libet studies this type of movements:  In order to shed experimental 
light on the genesis of free actions, Libet focuses on the simplest examples. 
The whimsical movements that he studies, however, are hardly meaningful 
examples of free agency. It is not even clear that Libet studies the relation 
between the intention to act and the act itself. The subjects in Libet’s experi-
ments are in fact invited to adopt a certain mental set, namely move wrist at 
random moment. The decision they have to make after this is not whether to 
move, but when to. And there are no reasons that govern this decision.19  
It is not with pointless movements that religion and morality are con-
cerned. They are concerned, rather, with our ability to act for a reason, and 
for a reason that we consider good. They are concerned with acts that are 
rooted in our deepest convictions and are the result of conscious delibera-
tion. It is not clear that Libet-experiments shed any light on these. Adina 
Roskies concludes: 
                                                 
17
 Roskies, ‘Why Libet’s Studies Don’t Pose a Threat to Free Will,’ 20–22. 
18
 Marcel Brass & Patrick Haggard, ‘To Do or Not to Do: The Neural Signature of Self-Control,’ 
The Journal of Neuroscience 27(34) (22 August 2007), 9141–9145. 
19
 Roskies, ‘Why Libet’s Studies Don’t Pose a Threat to Free Will,’ 18–19. 
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Arbitrary action is, at best, a degenerate case of freedom of the will. … Suppose 
… that it turned out that in purely arbitrary cases in the absence of reasons (in-
cluding foreseeable consequences of those actions), actions were the results of 
random fluctuations in the nervous system, and suppose further that in all 
cases in which there are reasons  relevant to the decision to act, we responded 
appropriately to these reasons, deliberating and weighing them, and then regu-
lating our actions so as to bring them in line with our deliberations.  Would we 
conclude on the basis of the random mechanisms that caused actions in cases 
where our actions had no consequences that we lacked freedom?20 
The answer is, of course: No. If this is how things stand, in the cases that 
matter we do have the relevant form of freedom. Consider the following ex-
ample: While dusk is beginning to fall, a couple is taking a stroll in the forest 
near their home. Towards the end of their walk, one of them believes that she 
has heard a women crying. They stand still and listen together, briefly discuss 
what might be the case and then run together into the direction from which 
the voice is coming. Up to then, their walk did not have a moral significance; 
even if their route had been the result of random fluctuations in their nerv-
ous systems, that is hardly relevant to the question whether they really have 
free will. The decision they make when they hear the cries, however, is mor-
ally relevant; and it this decision turned out to be the result of random fluc-
tuations rather than conscious deliberations, this would be very relevant to 
the question whether they have free will. On this type of decisions, however, 
Libet-type experiments do not shed much light. 
 
 
THE LIMITS OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON FREE WILL 
Benjamin Libet is perhaps the most prominent among those who bring 
empirical research to bear on questions of free will, but he is certainly not the 
only one: Robert Kane, Daniel Dennett and Daniel Wegner should be men-
tioned here as well.21 The reason that I don’t analyse their views here is that 
the above discussion of Libet’s experiments suffices to give us some insight 
                                                 
20
 Roskies, ‘Why Libet’s Studies Don’t Pose a Threat to Free Will,’ 18. Similar points are made in: 
Bayne, ‘Libet and the Case for Free Will Scepticism,’ 28–31; Mawson, Free Will, 132–133. 
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 Daniel C. Dennett, Freedom Evolves (New York: Viking, 2003); Robert R. Kane, The Significance 
of Free Will (Oxford: OUP, 1996); Kane, ‘Responsibility, Luck and Chance,’ Journal of Philosophy 96 
(1999), 217–240; Wegner, The Illusion of Conscious Will. Cf. Stephen Hawking & Leonard Mlodinow, 
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into both the value and the limits of empirical research on free will. Discus-
sion of more scholars and their positions would in this respect yield no new 
insights. 
We have seen that empirical research sheds some light on the question 
to what extent acts that in ordinary life we would call ‘free’ are causally de-
termined by processes other than conscious decisions. I write ‘some light’ 
because we have seen that Libet’s research concerns only a limited class of 
free actions – random and pointless bodily movements – and not the type of 
free actions that we would ordinarily consider of paramount importance: acts 
of moral or religious significance that are preceded by serious conscious de-
liberation. The current limitations of empirical research into free will, how-
ever, are not limitations of principle but of practice. This type of research is 
still in its infancy and we have good reason to suppose that in the long run it 
will provide fuller and more reliable data about Libet-type of actions and, 
moreover, will provide data about more central examples of exertion of the 
free will as well. It may well be the case, then, that in the long run the issue of 
determinism versus indeterminism will be empirically decidable. 
This, however, does not apply to the issue of compatibilism versus in-
compatibilism. The issue that is at stake here is not to what extent our ac-
tions are in fact determined,  but under which circumstances we are prepared 
to call an action free (and blame of praise a person for it) and under which 
circumstances not. That’s an issue on which we have to make up our minds 
on philosophical grounds and that cannot be decided by empirical research. 
Empirical research should settle the question to what extent our actions are 
determined; philosophy should help us settle whether we should call our ac-
tions free.22  
We have seen above that absence of coercion is insufficient for incom-
patibilists. Incompatibilists assert that an action is free only if the actor might 
have acted otherwise if s/he had wanted to. In other words, incompatibilists 
assert that an action is free if and only if (1) it is at least partly explained by a 
conscious decision of the actor, (2) the actor was capable of deciding other-
                                                 
22
 This also means that if one accepts determinism, it is up to philosophy and not to empirical re-
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118 MARCEL SAROT 
 
wise, so that the action in question would not have taken place, and (3) the 
decision of will itself cannot restlessly be explained from its causal antece-
dents. Incompatibilists therefore assume that free agency requires conscious 
states to be causally efficacious in producing an action in a way that cannot 
be restlessly explained in terms of genetics, environment, etc. Whether this is 
really required for free agency is a conceptual question to be discussed in phi-
losophy; whether this type of freedom actually obtains in our world, is an 
empirical question to be settled by science. 
Given the current scientific state of affairs, where does this bring us? 
Firstly, above I have distinguished between cosmic determinism and deter-
minism with respect to human will. On the standard interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics, cosmic determinism has been proven false, with quantum 
indeterminacy as the exception.23 Secondly, quantum indeterminacy does not 
suffice to prove that we have libertarian free will. It is not clear that quantum 
determinacy leads to indeterminacy at the level of phenomena that are ob-
servable with the naked eye, while that is the level at which we would like 
our free will to have effect.24 Moreover, even if higher level indeterminacy 
could be proven, that could be explained by chance rather than by volitional 
control. The fact that there is an exception to cosmic determinism does un-
dermine determinism, however. Thirdly, as I have shown in my discussion of 
Libet’s experiments, science is still a long way off from proving key examples 
of libertarian free will an illusion. In the absence of decisive scientific evi-
dence, other considerations should guide our decision on the issue of free 
will. Fourthly, one such consideration may be introspection, which – in the 
absence of scientific evidence to the contrary – provides a ‘very compelling’ 
argument in favour of libertarian free will. Fifthly, a second such considera-
tion is provided by the conceptual link between moral responsibility and lib-
ertarian free will. Until now, no convincing example has been given in which 
we would without hesitation hold someone without libertarian free will re-
sponsible for her actions.  
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1969), 77–87, 84; Mats J. Hansson, Understanding an Act of God: An Essay in Philosophical Theology 
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FINAL CONSIDERATION 
Those who reject libertarian free will mostly do so because of scientific 
reasons: they believe that science rules out the possibility that conscious de-
cisions that are themselves at least partly independent of (material) causal 
antecedents, decide our courses of action. However, while it is true that sci-
ence has not proven that conscious decisions are causal factors, it cannot rule 
them out either. And while it is true that on scientific grounds one cannot 
rule out the possibility that conscious decisions are epiphenomena of other 
conditions that can be studied empirically, one cannot prove them to be so 
either. Empirically, it is impossible to prove that consciousness is always and 
under all circumstances consciousness of  a body and originated by that body. 
Moreover, for those who believe in a conscious God or other supernatural 
conscious beings, this seems a very unpromising position to adopt. For it 
would imply that God could be no more than a function of this world (aliquid 
mundi)25, that He could in no way act or know or be independently of the 
world, and that He could neither begin to exist before creation began to exist, 
nor continue to exist after creation had stopped to exist. Therefore it seems 
that those philosophers of religion who defend the existence of a God who 
exists independently of the world, have good reason to defend the existence 
of libertarian free will as well. 
We have seen above that both morality and theism seem to require lib-
ertarian free will. Contrary to what is often thought, neuroscientific experi-
ments on free will like those of Benjamin Libet give us little reason to reject 
the idea that human beings have libertarian free will. Therefore these find-
ings do not undermine morality and religion either. 
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